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Multinational institutions face an important trade-off when hiring personnel. On the one hand, 
hiring decisions are based, as in most organizations, on a candidate’s professional 
qualifications. On the other hand, multinational institutions often aim for broad national 
representation. Reviewing evidence from the European Central Bank, we show that 
nationality is indeed relevant for both hiring and decision-making. Specifically, we identify 
various country-specific features that determine national representation in the top 
management of the ECB. Further, there is evidence for the existence of national networks 
between adjacent management layers. Finally, monetary policy decisions seem to be linked to 
national representation in the core business areas of the ECB. Examining a sample of 14 
European countries over the period from 1999 to 2008, we estimate Taylor rules for 
alternative sets of euro area aggregates derived from different weighting schemes of national 
macroeconomic data. Our results indicate that weights based on national representation in the 
mid-level management of the ECB's core business areas best describe the central bank's 
interest-rate setting behavior. 
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I. Introduction 
In central banking, the geographical background of decision-makers and staff is often 
an issue of considerable relevance. Some central banks require that its staff members have the 
nationality of the home country. The central bank of the Philippines, for instance, requires 
that applicants for employment must be Filipino citizens.
1 Other central banks have 
established monetary policy decision-making bodies in which, by law, (some) seats are 
explicitly allocated by region. In Pakistan, for instance, the central bank’s central board of 
directors comprises one director from each of the provinces.
2 
 
Having no firm basis in theory, the focus on geographical representation has, in 
practice, both benefits and costs. Governments and central banks that implement such rules 
generally aim to improve decision-making and credibility, two important conditions for the 
success of monetary policy. Specifically, it is argued that regional representatives bring with 
them specific knowledge of local conditions, thereby allowing to collect and process a 
broader range of information. Also, regional representatives are able to communicate 
decisions to a wider public.
3 At the same time, however, when the geographical background 
of an individual is taken explicitly into consideration, other potential criteria, most notably a 
candidate’s professional qualifications, automatically become relatively less important for 
appointment and promotion. 
 
In this paper, we examine empirically issues related to the geographical representation 
of personnel in central banks. Analyzing the composition of the management team at the 
European Central Bank (ECB), we ask whether regional features matter for employment. We 
also search for evidence of networks among staff members along regional lines. Finally, we 
                                                 
1 See http://www.bsp.gov.ph/about/recruitment.asp. Citizenship is a requirement that is occasionally even 
included in the central bank law, typically for influential positions such as board members or shareholders. For 
instance, for members of the Monetary Committee, Article 16 of the Bank of Israel law stipulates that "[a] 
member from amongst the public shall be qualified for appointment if he is a resident of Israel" (see 
http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/deptdata/pikuah/bank_hakika/eng/new_law_2010_eng.pdf). The South African 
Reserve Bank Act requires, in Article 4, that "[n]o person shall be appointed or elected as or remain a director if 
he or she is not resident in the Republic" (see 
http://www.reservebank.co.za/internet/Publication.nsf/LADV/7DC59462E47AFDDF42256ED60038AE5C/$Fil
e/S+A+Reserve+Bank+Act.pdf). The State Bank of Pakistan Act notes that "no person shall be registered as a 
shareholder [...] who is not a citizen of Pakistan" (see http://www.sbp.org.pk/about/act/SBP-Act.pdf). 
2 See http://www.sbp.org.pk/about/act/SBP-Act.pdf. In similar fashion, the central board of directors of the 
Reserve Bank of India comprises one director from each of the four local boards (see 
http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/PDFs/RBIA1934170510.pdf). Central banks that aim for broad 
regional representation in their supervisory bodies include Danmarks Nationalbank and the Swiss National Bank. 
3 See, for instance, Goodfriend (1999) for a more detailed discussion.   2
examine whether the regional composition of central bank staff has a measurable impact on 
policy-making. 
 
The focus on the ECB has, for our purposes, a number of useful features. First, the 
ECB is a multinational institution, such that nationality is a reasonable approach to 
differentiate geographical background.
 4 Also, nationality is a personal characteristic that is 
easily observed, both internally and externally. Second, the ECB is a young institution. 
Having been officially established in 1998, it had to build up its staff quickly from virtually 
zero so that there are hardly persistence effects in recruiting. Third, the ECB is an institution 
of great policy relevance. The ECB is not only the largest European Union financial body, it 
also has financial and organizational autonomy.
5 Given the ECB's genuine powers, 
governments of euro area member states should have a strong incentive for national 
representation in this institution.
6 Fourth, in contrast to other policy areas in the European 
Union, monetary policy directly affects economic conditions in all euro area member 
countries, thereby providing another strong incentive for national representation. 
 
In our analysis, we focus particularly on national representation at the management 
level of the ECB, a choice that is motivated by a large organizational literature. For instance, 
Pfeffer (1985, p. 68) argues that "[o]rganizations are full of people. It often seems only natural 
and appropriate to analyze and manage organizations using individuals as the units of 
analysis." Thereby, we go substantially beyond previous work with a focus on national 
representation in the ECB's decision-making body, the Governing Council.
7 Instead of 
examining de jure representation of countries as defined in political documents, we analyze de 
facto presence of nationals in the institution. Specifically, we estimate panel data models for 
staff shares of the 27 member states of the European Union (EU) in the top management of 
the ECB over the period from 1999 through 2010. 
 
Previewing our results, we find that a nation's share of ECB managers is reasonably 
explained by country-level determinants of job applications (such as a country's distance from 
the ECB headquarter) rather than broad geographical representation. This finding seems to 
                                                 
4 Egeberg (1996) follows a similar approach. 
5 The European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund are other financial bodies of the European 
Union (see http://europa.eu/institutions/financial/index_en.htm). 
6 Scheller (2004, p. 44) notes: "As an organization created by the EC Treaty, the ECB enjoys genuine powers. 
[...] This feature distinguishes the ECB from the various decentralized agencies of the Community, which 
possess their own legal personality but have competences delegated to them by the Community institutions." 
7 Examples include, among others, Heinemann and Huefner (2004) and Belke and von Schnurbein (2011).   3
indicate that hiring decisions are generally made on the basis of a candidate's professional 
qualifications. Still, national background also seems to matter for recruitment. There is 
evidence that strong national representation at a particular management level is typically 
associated with similarly strong national presence at the subordinate management layer. 
Finally, based on Taylor rule estimates to describe the ECB's interest-rate setting behavior, we 
find that monetary policy decisions are most closely linked to national representation in the 
core business areas of the ECB. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the relevant 
literature. Section III provides some institutional background on the European Central Bank, 
followed by a description of the data in section IV. The heart of the paper is section V which 
presents our empirical model and the estimation results. Section VI briefly summarizes our 
findings. 
 
II. Related Literature 
Our paper is related to various strands of the literature. There has been extensive work, 
for instance, on regional representation in a central bank's main decision-making body, the 
monetary policy committee. Specifically, a number of studies have examined to what extent 
the presence of regional representatives in the board has affected monetary policy decisions. 
Reviewing the voting records of individual board members, there seems to be consistent 
evidence that regional economic conditions help explain dissent voting of regional 
representatives. Berger and De Haan (2002), for example, argue that economic differences 
across German states translated into differences in voting behavior in the Bundesbank's 
Governing Council (Zentralbankrat) in which all German state central banks held voting 
rights. Similarly, Gildea (1992), Meade and Sheets (2005), and Chappell Jr., McGregor and 
Vermilyea (2008), among others, find that members of the Federal Open Market Committee 
in the US are influenced in voting by economic conditions in the regions that they represent. 
None of these papers has considered regional representation at the staff level. 
 
A sizable body of work is concerned with the design of central bank committees more 
generally. With reference to regional representation, Berger, Nitsch, and Lybek (2008) find 
that politically fragmented countries typically have larger monetary policy committees. 
Berger and Nitsch (2011) show that central banks with required regional representation tend 
to achieve, on average, lower inflation.   4
 
Another relevant strand of the literature focuses on the effects of individuals in 
organizations. In an interesting study, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that corporate 
managers measurably affect firm behavior and economic performance. Moreover, they 
identify differences in "styles" across managers which can then be linked to observable 
managerial characteristics. For instance, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) note that executives 
from earlier birth cohorts seem to be on average more conservative, while managers with an 
MBA degree tend to follow more aggressive strategies. For central banks, Göhlmann and 
Vaubel (2007) find that board members who were previously member of the central bank staff 
prefer significantly lower inflation rates than former politicians do. In similar fashion, Dreher, 
Lamla, Lein, and Somogyi (2009) argue that heads of government who are former 
entrepreneurs are more likely to implement market-liberalizing reforms; Besley, Montalvo 
and Reynal-Querol (2011) find that more educated political leaders generate higher economic 
growth. While we are generally sympathetic with the finding that individuals have an effect 
on organizational outcomes, we deviate from this literature in various respects. For one thing, 
our focus is exclusively on the regional background of individuals instead of their educational 
and professional qualifications.
8 More importantly, we examine a much broader group of 
individuals. Instead of examining the role of leaders, we cover in our analysis the (various) 
top management levels of an organization. 
 
In this respect, our approach is also related to an interesting literature, mainly in 
management science, on the demographic structure of organizations. This literature refrains 
from the analysis of individual features and emphasizes, in contrast, the compositional aspects 
of organizations. Pfeffer (1985, p. 79) argues, for instance, that "[t]he difficulty with this 
[individualistic] approach is its neglect of the interdependence and relationships that are the 
essential, indeed defining, characteristic of organizations." 
 
III. The ECB 
The process of European integration is characterized by a delegation of functions, in a 
growing number of policy areas, from the national level to the European Union. In many 
instances this has led to the establishment of new multi- and supranational institutions.
9 The 
                                                 
8 While it would be interesting to also analyze personal characteristics of managers other than nationality, 
relevant data for such a large and diverse group of people is almost impossible to obtain. 
9 As a result, there are, in the meantime, many EU institutions, agencies, bodies, commissions and committees. 
An early example is the EURATOM Supply Agency, founded in 1960 and headquartered in Luxembourg, which 
is responsible for the regular and equitable supply of nuclear fuels for Community users. A very recent example,   5
European Central Bank is a particularly important case in point. When the decision was taken 
to complete the Single Market with a single currency, responsibilities for monetary policy 
needed to be centralized. As a result, the ECB was created, which forms, along with the 
national central banks of the euro area member countries, the monetary policy-making 
authority in the euro area, the Eurosystem.
10 
 
The official agreements about the establishment of the ECB date back to the Treaty on 
European Union ('Maastricht Treaty'), which was signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992. 
The Treaty defined the monetary policy framework in the economic and monetary union; it 
also contained the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of the ECB 
which was attached as a Protocol to the Treaty.
11  
 
For the immediate preparatory work, the European Monetary Institute (EMI) was 
established as a transitory body on 1 January 1994.
12 The objective of the EMI was, among 
other things, to specify the regulatory, organizational and logistical framework necessary for 
the ESCB to perform its tasks. Based on the EMI's conceptual design, the ECB was finally 
established on 1 June 1998, while the EMI went into liquidation. Seven months later, on 1 
January 1999, eleven EU member states adopted the euro as their common currency, and the 
ECB took over responsibility for conducting the single monetary policy in the euro area. 
 
As liquidator of the EMI, the ECB inherited the EMI infrastructure. Scheller (2004, p. 
25) argues that the infrastructure included "a body of staff which had been prepared to 
undertake its duties at the ECB". Most of the EMI staff, however, were on fixed-term 
contracts, so that the ECB faced effectively no restrictions from the past in setting up 
                                                                                                                                                          
in contrast, is the European Banking Authority, established on 1 January 2011 and headquartered in London, 
which is a regulatory agency for the financial sector. See http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/index_en.htm for an 
overview. 
10 Baldwin and Wyplosz (2009, p. 495) note: "Each member [country] still comes equipped with its own central 
bank, the last remaining vestige of lost monetary sovereignty. No matter how daring the founding fathers of the 
EMU were, they stopped short of merging the national central banks into a single institution, partly for fear of 
having to dismiss thousands of employees." 
11 Article 105(2) of the Treaty notes: "The basic tasks to be carried out through the ESCB shall be: to define and 
implement the monetary policy of the Community[...]." Article 106 notes:  "(1) The ESCB shall be composed of 
the ECB and of the national central banks. (2) The ECB shall have legal personality." See 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/maastricht_en.pdf. 
12 The EMI replaced the Committee of Governors of the central banks of the member states, as specified in 
Article 109f(1) of the Treaty. Operationally, the EMI started with the 28 staff members of the secretariat of the 
Committee of Governors in Basle.   6
management and staffing structures.
13 More importantly, staff size of the ECB has quadrupled 
after establishment, rising from a permanent staff of 407 on 31 May 1998 to a full-time 
equivalent number of 1607 at the end of 2010. Over the same period, the number of 
managerial positions has increased by more than factor three, rising from 45 to 156. In sum, 
the ECB can be plausibly described as an institution, which had to build up its staff from 
virtually zero after creation. 
 
For the employment decisions of the ECB, there are no political, administrative or 
other external constraints. Partly reflecting the institution's independence, Article 36.1 of the 
Statute of the ESCB and the ECB stipulates that "[t]he Governing Council [of the ECB], on a 
proposal from the Executive Board, shall lay down the conditions of employment of the staff 
of the ECB". The conditions were then fixed in the Rules of Procedure at the ECB, adopted 
by the Governing Council, and turn out to be very general principles. Article 20.2 of the Rules 
states that "[m]embers of staff shall be selected, appointed and promoted with due regard to 




The selection process was further specified in Administrative Circular 5/2004 which 
contains detailed rules for recruitment. Apart from the general rule that the ECB appoints only 
nationals of European Union member states, which seems to be in line with the Staff 
Regulations of officials of the European Communities
15, this document lays down additional 
rules on nationality. Specifically, recruitment at the ECB is directed at the broadest possible 
geographical representation, without imposing a specific national quota. Article 5.4 of the 
Circular explicitly states: "In the event that candidates have equal qualifications for a position, 
gender and/or nationality may be used as additional criteria for the selection decision with a 
view to achieving a balanced representation of gender and/or nationalities."
 16  In the 
                                                 
13 The Annual Report of the EMI for 1994 states (p. 66): "Members of staff have generally been appointed on 
three-year fixed-term contracts."; see http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/annrep/ar1994en.pdf. The view of no 
contractual restrictions is confirmed in the Annual Report of the ECB for 1998, noting (p. 145): "Most EMI staff 
contracts were due to expire at the end of 1998. By the date on which these statements were drawn up, 322 
permanent staff had transferred to the ECB under new contracts."; see 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/annrep/ar1998en.pdf. 
14 See http:// www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/l_33819981215en00280033.pdf. 
15 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/consleg/1962/R/01962R0031-20060701-en.pdf. 
16 Article 5.2 notes: "Without prejudice to the principle stated above, the selection process shall also be directed 
to securing the broadest possible geographical basis from among nationals of Member States of the European 
Union. No nationality quota shall apply and no vacancy shall be reserved for a specific nationality." See 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/jobs/pdf/recruitmentrules.pdf.   7




At the heart of our paper is a newly compiled panel data set on the nationality of top 
managers at the European Central Bank. In contrast to previous studies which often focus on a 
central bank's monetary policy committee, we cover all management layers of the ECB, 
including the heads of directorates, divisions and sections. Our data set is based on the 
organizational charts of the ECB. The ECB regularly publishes charts of its organizational 
structure along with the names (but not the nationalities) of the responsible managers, in the 
most current version, on its website. We have compiled the charts for the period from 1999 to 




In total, the ECB has appointed, since its establishment, 210 individuals on managerial 
positions (including deputies). For each individual, we aim to identify the nationality. To do 
so, we use a variety of sources, including internet search, newswire reports and personal 
communication. Overall, we were able to confirm the nationality of 190 individuals, except 
for a few managers of mainly technical and administrative divisions. In our analysis, we deal 
with those missings in three ways. As our baseline approach, we impose nationality based on 
the name of the individual. This procedure is relatively straightforward and simple; it also 
allows us to analyze the full sample. Alternatively, we drop individuals without proper 
information on nationality. Finally, we focus our analysis on the divisions of key importance 
for the operations of the ECB (core business areas), thereby reducing the number of 
individuals with missing nationality. 
 
The top decision-making body of the ECB is the Governing Council, which comprises 
the Presidents/Governors of the national central banks of the member countries of the euro 
area and the 6-member Executive Board. Given the politically-determined composition of this 
body (with members being appointed at the level of heads of state or government), our focus 
is on the remaining levels of management. The ECB's organizational structure below the 
Governing Council initially consisted of two management levels; i) the directorates general or 
directorates, and ii) divisions. After a period of strong growth of the institution, sections were 
                                                 
17 We are indebted to the ECB's Press Division for the kind provision of missing information.   8
introduced as third management level in 2003. Table 1 describes the evolution of the number 
of (filled) management positions at the ECB over time. In addition, there is, for each position, 
the option of establishing a deputy head. In our empirical analysis, we experiment with both 
groups of managers, heads only and heads and deputies combined. Fortunately, our results 
turn out to be generally consistent across samples. 
 
Our central bank data is augmented with data from a number of standard sources, 
including the IMF's International Financial Statistics, the World Bank's World Development 
Indicators and OECD statistics. A detailed list of variables and sources is provided in an 
appendix. Our sample covers the 27 member countries of the European Union. Since 12 of 
these countries have entered the European Union during the sample period, the panel is 
unbalanced. We only include countries which, as members of the EU, have subscribed to the 
capital of the ECB. 
18 
 
V. Empirical Analysis 
 
5.1 Who Gets Appointed? 
We begin our empirical analysis by examining patterns of national representation in 
the management of the ECB. Specifically, we aim to identify to what extent the ECB's aim of 
"broadest possible geographical representation" indeed matters for recruitment. If candidates 
are mainly selected according to their professional qualifications, we should be able to 
identify a number of country-specific features that determine the share of top positions filled 
by national representatives. For instance, the probability of a perfect fit of the applicant's 
personal profile with the requirements of an open position is higher for nationalities with a 
large pool of applicants. Since the ECB is likely to receive a larger number of applications 
from individuals of more populous, economically well-educated and geographically close 
countries, these countries should be disproportionately strongly represented in the ECB.
 19 
Broad representation of nationalities, in contrast, would imply that the selection decision for 
hiring or promotion is largely based on an individual's national background. Consequently, 
qualifications (and, thus, country features potentially determining the fit of applications) 
                                                 
18 In practice, the ECB has started recruiting from accession countries more than a year before entry into the 
European Union (that is, immediately after the treaty of accession to the EU was signed). For our analysis, 
however, this difference is without relevance. 
19 Alternatively, one could hypothesize that the governments of some countries may have a particularly strong 
preference for representation at the ECB and thereby provide a special training or preparation for potential 
candidates from the home country.   9
become less relevant for appointment; in the extreme, each country has the same share of 
representatives in the management of the ECB. 
 
To analyze this issue, we run regressions of the following general form: 
 
    , , , , ,
 
t i t i
E





t i R ,  is the share of managers in the ECB from country i at management level in 
year t, 
E
t i S ,  denotes the share of equal representation of each EU member country,  t i, x is a 
vector of country-specific features, and 

t i,   is a standard error term. Our key variable of 
interest is the benchmark measure 
E




t i N S S / 1 ,   , where Nt  is the 
number of EU members countries at time t. To the extent that top positions in the ECB are 
filled with candidates on a broad geographical basis, we expect that national shares of 
managers approach this benchmark so that the estimated parameter on this variable takes a 
statistically significant positive value.
 20 
 
In our empirical implementation, we estimate variants of (1) separately for individual 
management levels , using an (unbalanced) sample of 27 European countries over the period 
from 1999 to 2010 with a total of 248 observations. As potential country-specific 
determinants of national representation in the ECB, we consider a country's share in the 
capital of the ECB (which also proxies for demographic and economic size of a country)
 21, 
membership in the euro area, the distance of the national capital from the ECB headquarter in 
Frankfurt, the staff size of the national central bank, and two dummy variables indicating 
whether the country's official language is German or English, respectively. 
 
Table 2 presents the results. Each column tabulates the result of a separate regression. 
We start our investigation by examining country shares at individual management levels 
(columns 1-3). Next, we explore aggregate shares of country representation at the ECB 
                                                 
20 We use the share in EU countries (rather than the share in euro area countries) since citizens of all EU member 
states are eligible for employment with the ECB; see http://www.ecb.int/ecb/jobs/apply/html/index.en.html. In 
our analysis, we control for the effect of euro area membership. 
21 Capital shares are determined (and regularly recalculated) based on a country's total population and GDP (in 
equal weightings); see http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/capital/html/index.en.html.   10
(columns 4-5), using both the total number of managers across the three management levels 
as well as the level-weighted number of managers for aggregation.
22 Finally, for 
completeness, we also provide results for national representation in the Governing Council of 
the ECB (columns 6-7). 
 
The key parameter of interest to us is  E  , the estimated parameter on the benchmark 
share of equal representation. As shown, the point estimate is typically small in magnitude 
and statistically indistinguishable from zero, indicating that national shares of managers differ 
sizably across countries. Moreover, shares seem to deviate from equality in systematic 
fashion; a number of parameters on country-specific features turn out to be sensible and 
precisely estimated. Also, the regressions fit the data reasonably well, explaining more than 
three-fourths of the variation in national representation. In sum, the estimates strongly 
indicate that recruitment at the management level of the ECB is dominated by factors other 
than equal geographical representation. 
 
Reviewing the estimated parameters in more detail, several results are worth 
emphasizing. A first observation is that, at almost all management levels of the ECB 
(including the Governing Council), country size matters for representation: Countries with a 
larger capital share in the ECB and (often) a larger staff size of the national central bank tend 
to have more representatives in the management of the ECB. A reasonable explanation for 
this finding may be, as already mentioned before, that in these countries there seems to be a 
greater supply of able central bankers. 
 
In contrast, only for top management positions at the ECB, membership in the euro 
area is significantly (positively) associated with national representation. While euro area 
membership is a precondition for representation in the decision-making Governing Council, 
the association becomes weaker as the management level declines. The euro area dummy 
even loses significance for division and section heads, possibly reflecting the ECB's aspiration 
to document its EU-wide recruitment strategy in the organizational chart; this approach seems 
to be most easily possible and justifiable for less influential management positions. 
 
                                                 
22 We assign a weight of 1 for directorates, 0.5 for divisions and 0.25 for sections. To avoid losing observations, 
weighted aggregates for the period up to 2004 are calculated based on directorates and divisions only.    11
There are similarly mixed results for other country features. It seems easier to find and 
attract promising candidates for the filling of positions at lower management levels if they 
live already close to Frankfurt (Germany), the location of the headquarter of the ECB, and/or 
speak German. Also, being a native speaker of English is especially important at the section 
head level. Interestingly, none of these characteristics is of relevance at the top (directorate) 
level, a (non-)result that is line with the hypothesis that the director position is highly 
competitive, allowing to recruit qualified candidates from a broad range of countries. 
 
We have performed extensive robustness checks. To economize on space, Table 3 
presents a subset of the results of those exercises, tabulating estimates for the specification 
with the total number of representatives only. We modify our sample along various 
dimensions. In the first column, we examine a sample when individuals for which we have no 
confirmed information on nationality are dropped. Our baseline results remain basically 
unchanged for this perturbation. Next, we add information on deputy heads (in addition to 
department heads) to our count measure of national managers, again producing essentially 
similar results. In another exercise, we focus exclusively on managers in the ECB's core 
business areas. These functional units are of particular interest and relevance as they are 
directly involved in the formulation and implementation of the ECB's monetary policy.
 23 
Interestingly, for the core areas, membership in the euro area seems to become an important 
precondition for appointment. In contrast, knowledge of the German language is less relevant 
than before. A plausible explanation may be that it is especially in supporting business areas 
(such as infrastructure), where interactions with local businesses (and, thus, the ability to 
properly communicate with locals) are particularly important. Again, none of our results are 
changed when we additionally take ECB managers with deputy function into consideration. 
Finally, our baseline results are basically confirmed when Germany is dropped from the 
sample. Overall, our finding that the management structure of the ECB deviates from the 
plain principle of broad geographical representation turns out to be reasonably robust. 
 
5.2 Does Presence in Top Management Matter for Appointment? 
                                                 
23 The ECB has defined as its core business areas: Banknotes; Economics; Financial Stability; International and 
European Relations; Legal Services; Market Operations; Payments and Market Infrastructure; Research; 
Statistics; the Target2-Securities Program; and the ECB Permanent Representation in Washington, DC. 
Supporting business areas are: Counsel to the Executive Board; Administration; Communications; Human 
Resources, Budget and Organization; Information Systems; Internal Audit and Secretariat and Language 
Services. See http://www.ecb.int/ecb/educational/facts/orga/html/or_005.en.html.   12
In a next step, we explore the possible existence of national networks in the ECB. 
Specifically, we analyze whether national presence at top management levels also affects 
national representation at lower management levels. It could be argued, for instance, that, 
after a change in the ECB's top management, nationals of other countries are targeted for 
lower-level positions in order to achieve broad geographical representation within a given 
business area; that is, there should be a gradual replacement at lower management levels (to 
the extent individual contracts allow for such behavior
24). Alternatively, nationals at the top 
level may act as a door-opener for fellow nationals. Specifically, given that in the day-to-day 
business, personal interaction is often crucially important, there may be a tendency to select 
subordinates that share the same language and culture. 
 
To analyze these issues empirically, we augment our baseline regression framework 
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where P is a binary dummy variable that takes the value of one if the President of the 
ECB is from country i, and a zero otherwise, VP and EB are analogous variables for the Vice 
President of the ECB and other Executive Board members, respectively, and 

t i R ,  is the share 
of national representation at management level  above the level of the regressand  ) ( .  
 
Estimation results are tabulated in Table 4. As before, the management level is varied 
as dependent variable across columns, beginning with the most senior (directorate) level on 
the left of the table. Also, we include the full set of country features x in the regressions, but, 
for the sake of brevity, only the estimates of  are reported. The results in the first column 
indicate that individuals who share the nationality of the president are more likely to be 
appointed as head of directorate/directorate general, holding constant other country-specific 
determinants for representation in the top management of the ECB. Taken at face value, the 
point estimate of 0.07 implies that the share of directors at the ECB is, on average, 
                                                 
24 Changes in the responsibilities of senior managers in the ECB are indeed "in accordance with its policy to 
promote mobility within the ECB, which is aimed at strengthening the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
organization"; see http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2006/html/pr060803_2.en.html.   13
7 percentage points larger for the home country of the President than for other countries. As 
noted before, however, this observation may be not particularly surprising, given that there 
are some sensitive positions (such as head of communications) where cultural differences 
between individuals should be avoided. For the Vice President, in contrast, the (negative) 
coefficient indicates that fellow nationals face a disproportionately low probability of 
appointment at the top management (directorate) level.  
 
The second column presents analogous results for the second management level, heads 
of divisions. Except for a now moderate negative effect of Vice Presidency, none of the 
variables for national presence in the Executive Board of the ECB has a measurable impact on 
the number of representatives at this level. However, when we extend our analysis to also 
include the number of representatives at the top management level (column 3), the coefficient 
on this variable takes a significantly positive sign, implying that strong national presence at 
the directorate level is associated with disproportionately large presence at the division level. 
 
The observation of national network effects between adjacent management layers is 
confirmed at the lowest ECB management level, sections. Results for alternative 
specifications are tabulated in the final four columns on the right of Table 4. While the results 
for the various levels of senior management are mixed, with slight overrepresentation of the 
home country of the Vice President among section heads and disproportionately low presence 
of the nationality of the President and other Executive Board members, the national presence 
at the division level (i.e., the direct supervisor) has a strong positive effect on representation at 
the section level. In sum, our findings clearly suggest that presence in the top management 
has a positive effect on national representation at lower management levels, indicating the 
existence of national network effects. 
 
We have checked the sensitivity of our results along various lines. Table 5 reports the 
results of two modifications to our baseline framework, tabulating for each modification 
separate estimates for the three management levels of the ECB. As before, we begin by 
extending our sample to additionally take account of the nationality of deputy heads. We also 
restrict our sample to include only the core business areas of the ECB. For none of these 
perturbations, however, there is a notable change in our results. There are clear indications of 
a positive link between national presence in neighboring management levels. 
   14
5.3 Monetary Policy Effects of National Representation 
Does national representation in the ECB affect monetary policy decision-making? 
Previous studies have strongly focused on the national distribution of votes in the ECB 
decision-making body, the Governing Council.
 25 We examine the association between 
national representation in the ECB's top management and monetary policy decision-making. 
 
To analyze this issue, we estimate Taylor-type interest rate rules that are typically 
found to describe actual monetary policy reasonably well. Taylor rules specify the nominal 
interest rate as function of inflation and the output gap. For the ECB, whose monetary policy 
is targeted at the euro area, the variables of interest for policy-making are weighted averages 
of national data from euro area member countries. Therefore, we compute euro area 
aggregates and estimate corresponding Taylor rules, based on alternative weighting schemes 
for national data, exploring the empirical fit of these rules. 
 
Our baseline specification follows English, Nelson and Sack (2003), who use a Taylor 
rule specification that allows for both partial adjustment of the actual to the target interest rate 
and for serial correlation in the error term. These two features are considered as relevant in 




The full model is made up of three equations. Consider a forward-looking Taylor rule 
in which the target interest rate 
*
t i  is described as a function of the deviation of future 
expected inflation 
e
t   from its target  t   and the change in the output gap, i.e., the deviation 
of expected output growth 
e
t y ln   from (expected) growth of potential output  t y ln  :
27 
 






t t y y i             ,        ( 3 )  
 
                                                 
25 For instance, Berger and Mueller (2007) argue that the pattern of over- and under-representation of member 
countries in the ECB Council might be extreme. 
26 For recent applications of this approach, see Gorter, Jacobs and de Haan (2008) and Sturm and de Haan 
(2011). 
27 In the empirical literature, it has become standard practice to use the change in the output gap rather than its 
level. Walsh (2003) advocates the use of such a modified Taylor rule in the presence of uncertainty about the 
output gap. For a discussion of the advantages of using growth rates rather than levels, see Sturm and 
Wollmershäuser (2008, p. 4).   15
so that   denotes the neutral nominal interest rate, i.e., the interest rate, when inflation is at 
its target and output growth is equal to trend growth. 
 
In practice, it seems reasonable to assume that the actual interest rate i is adjusted only 
gradually to its target level so that: 
 
      t t t t i i i         
*
1 ) 1 ,       ( 4 )  
 
where  ) 1     is the speed of adjustment parameter. Finally, the error term is allowed to 
exhibit first order serial correlation: 
 
        . 1 t t t            ( 5 )  
 
Using then a Cochrane-Orcutt transformation and rewriting the equation in first 
differences, we obtain (see English, Nelson, and Sack, 2003): 
 
    t t t t t t i i i i i                  1 1
*
1
* ) )( 1 (    ( 6 )  
 
which is our benchmark empirical model. 
 
In our empirical implementation, we use the ECB's main refinancing rate as dependent 
variable. The main refinancing rate is the key interest rate, set by the Governing Council, and 
assumed to reflect directly the ECB's monetary policy setting behavior. In extensive 




We estimate our model using monthly data
 for the period from January 1999 to June 
2008.
 29 Data on expected inflation and output growth are obtained from Consensus 
Economics. Following the literature, we use the professional forecasts of inflation and output 
growth in the current and the following year to construct monthly measures of real-time 
                                                 
28 Since the estimates are qualitatively identical, we do not report the results. 
29 Extending the sample to also include more recent months would bias the Taylor rule estimate towards the 
output gap at the expense of the inflation rate (which becomes insignificant). This result is not too surprising, 
given that the ECB interest rates have been at record lows during times of financial crisis.    16
expectations for the key macroeconomic variables.
30 The series for the euro area are then 
obtained as weighted averages of the country values, i.e., 
 

















m t i t i
e
m t y y
1
, , , , ln  ,   (7) 
 
where, in our benchmark specification, the weight  t i,   is country i's share in the real GDP of 
the euro area in year t, and Nt is the (time-variant) number of euro area member countries. 
31 
Finally, in order to quantify macroeconomic conditions as deviation from medium-term 
targets, we set target inflation to 2%, based on the ECB's definition of price stability, and 
assume potential output growth of 2.25%, using the mid-point of the interval given by the 
ECB. 
 
Table 6 presents baseline estimation results for specifications of the Taylor rule when 
a country's share of euro area real GDP is used as weight t.
32 We proceed stepwise. The first 
column reports parameter estimates for the full model with no restrictions. As shown, it turns 
out that the AR parameter  is insignificant in our sample, which may be explained by the 
smooth time series properties of the main refinancing rate. In the next column, therefore, we 
tabulate results for a specification when  = 0. For this modification, the parameter estimates 
slightly decrease in magnitude, but the overall results remain essentially unchanged. Most 
notably, the point estimates of the parameters for expected inflation and the change in the 
output gap again turn out to be virtually identical. The estimates imply that an increase in 
expected inflation (the expected change in the output gap) by 1 percentage point induces an 
increase in the ECB's main refinancing rate by 1.9 percent (that is, the expected real interest 
                                                 
30 More specifically, we compute the weighted average of the Consensus forecasts for the current year (c) and 
















 , where 
c
m t,   and 
f
m t,   denote Consensus forecasts for country i in year t, 
month m, for the rate of inflation (in percent) in the current and following year, respectively. An analogous 





















y , with 
c
m t i y , , ln   and 
f
m t i y , , ln   denoting Consensus 
forecasts for GDP growth (in percent) in the current and the following year, respectively; see also Gorter, Jacobs 
and de Haan (2008). 
31 All shares are defined with respect to the current size of euro area at time t (that is, the shares always sum to 
one). Cyprus, Malta, and Luxembourg are dropped from our sample, because survey data from Consensus 
Economics is not available. 
32 Results turn out to be virtually identical when a country's capital subscription key in the ECB is used.    17
rate increases after an upsurge in inflation expectations).
 33 Also, interest rates display a high 
degree of persistence; the point estimate of  indicates that about 10 percent of the difference 
between the actual rate and the target rate is closed each month. Finally, the empirical fit of 
the regression is satisfactory with an R
2 of 0.231. Overall, we consider the (restricted) model 
in the second column of Table 6 as our preferred specification of the Taylor rule. 
 
In column three, we re-estimate the model by two stages least squares (2SLS), using 
the first and second time lag of the explanatory variable as instruments, to address potential 
concerns of endogeneity. For this estimation technique, the point estimates of the response 
parameters are virtually unchanged and a Hausman-type test cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the least squares estimates and the 2SLS estimates are identical. 
 
Finally, we provide, for completeness, an OLS estimation of our preferred 
specification for a shorter subsample of our data, covering the period from 2004 to 2008. In 
2004, after years of strong growth in staff size, the ECB changed its management structure by 
introducing sections as a new management layer. The sample size is reduced by more than 
one-half and the empirical fit of our regression decreases sizably. As shown in the last column 
of Table 6, the R
2 drops to 0.122 for this shorter period. 
 
To identify possible effects of the national composition of the ECB management on 
decision-making, we next explore whether other specifications of the Taylor rule better 
describe ECB monetary policy. Specifically, we vary the weights  t i,   in the derivation of the 
euro area aggregates for output growth and inflation gaps. If monetary policy is directed more 
strongly towards the macroeconomic conditions in countries that are well represented in the 
ECB management, we would expect that Taylor rule specifications that use national 
representation as weights to aggregate national data provide a superior empirical fit than the 
default specification based on economic weights. Our benchmark values for the R
2 from 
Table 6 are 0.231 for the full period (1999-2008) and 0.122 for the shorter sample (2004-
2008). 
 
Table 7 reports the results. We begin with the estimates for the top management layer 
of the ECB, directorates/directorates general. As shown in column 1, the point estimates of 
                                                 
33 The finding of symmetric weighting of inflation and economic growth in the ECB's monetary policy is a 
remarkable result, although not new to the literature. Sturm and Wollmershäuser (2008, p. 13) conclude that "the 
ECB takes movements in real variables at least as serious as movements in inflation".   18
the coefficients slightly differ from the regression based on economic weights, but generally 
remain sensibly and precisely estimated. The key statistic of interest, however, is the R
2, 
which gives the amount of variation in the interest rate that is explained by the estimated 
Taylor rule. With an R
2 of 0.184, the empirical fit of the regression falls notably when 
national representation at the directorates level of the ECB is used to aggregate national 
macroeconomic data. 
 
The next two columns tabulate analogous results for the other two management layers 
of the ECB. While the findings for divisions display a much better empirical fit, the R
2 is still 
below the baseline regression. In contrast, with an R
2 of 0.230, the specification based on the 
national weight of ECB section heads (for the period 2004-2008, for which data on 
representation at the section level is available) performs dramatically better than the 
specification based on national economic weights with an R
2 of 0.122. National representation 
at the sections level appears to have an effect on the formulation of ECB monetary policy. 
 
Aggregated measures of national representation in the ECB management (which also 
cover sections after their establishment in 2004) confirm this finding. When a country's share 
in the total number of managers is used as weight, the empirical fit of the regression is slightly 
better than in the baseline version. The effect is lowered, however, once the number of 
managers in a given year is weighted by the respective management layer, with sections 
receiving the smallest weight. 
 
Finally, the three columns on the right of Table 7 tabulate the results for various 
groups of the Governing Council. Reassuringly, given that Council members are expected to 
make decisions exclusively based on information for the euro area aggregate, national 
representation in the Council has no measurable effect on the appropriateness of ECB 
monetary policy for individual countries as measured by the empirical fit of a Taylor rule 
specification; the R
2 decreases from 0.23 to about 0.20. 
 
Table 8 presents results for two sets of sensitivity checks. As before, we experiment 
with additionally taking into account the nationality of deputies when computing our measure 
of national representation at the management of the ECB. The results are tabulated in the first 
four columns of the table, again varying across management layers. For this modification, the   19
estimated parameters turn out to be slightly larger in magnitude, but our conclusions remain 
largely unchanged. 
 
Next, we examine national representation in the management of the core business 
areas of the ECB. Regression results are shown in the last four columns of Table 8. The 
findings strongly indicate that national presence in the management of the ECB's key business 
units is associated with an interest rate-setting policy of the ECB that better suits the 
economic conditions (and, thus, national interests) of these countries. For both, divisions and 
sections, the empirical fit of the regression improves markedly, a finding that is replicated for 
the total number of managers. On average, we observe an increase in the R
2 of about 2 
percentage points compared with the results derived from overall national representation in 
the ECB's management.  
 
While our discussion is mainly focused on the results for the full sample period from 
1999 to 2008, it should be noted that our findings become even stronger if we restrict our 
sample to the period after the appointment of section heads in the ECB (for which the 
empirical fit in the baseline regression was found to be much weaker). For instance, in 
unreported results, the R
2 of the Taylor rule using total representation in the management of 
the ECB (in the core business areas only) for the short sample period from 2004:2 to 2008:6 is 
0.196 (0.228), compared with an R
2 of 0.122 in the default specification using economic 
weights. In sum, there is convincing evidence that the empirical fit of the Taylor rule based on 
national representation weights in the management of the ECB clearly exceeds the fit of the 
rule that is observed for euro area aggregates based on economic weights. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
Multinational institutions face an important trade-off when hiring personnel. As in 
most organizations, hiring decisions are mainly based on a candidate’s professional 
qualifications. In addition, however, multinational institutions often aim for broad national 
representation, for various reasons. Potential benefits include greater diversity of personal 
backgrounds and access to local knowledge which may help implement policies (potentially 
leading to broader acceptance). At the same time, however, cultural issues may also become a 
hindrance to organizational success. Possible costs include forgoing talent for geographic 
variety, network effects and a national bias in decision-making. 
   20
Looking at the European Central Bank, we show that nationality is indeed relevant for 
both hiring and decision-making. We identify various country-specific features that determine 
national representation in the top management of the ECB. Further, there is evidence for the 
existence of national networks between adjacent management layers. Finally, monetary policy 
decisions seem to be linked to national representation in the core business areas of the ECB. 
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Table 1: The ECB – A Growing Institution 
 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Directorates, Direct's General  18 20 20 21 21 21 20 20 20 20 20 19 
Divisions  34 49 51 52 53 51 52 52 52 52 54 55 
Sections  –  –  –  –  –  33 32 36 37 41 49 49 
additional information:              
National Central Banks
1  11 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 13 15 16 16 
Executive Board  6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
ECB Staff






Notes: The table lists the number of managers at different ECB management levels (no deputies). The data refer to the beginning of the year. 
1 Governors of national central banks of euro area member countries who are automatically member of the ECB Governing Council  
2 End of previous year 
3 Full-time equivalent positions 









































































































































         
Obs  248 248 173 248 248 248 248 
Adj. R
2  0.80 0.90 0.80 0.90 0.90 0.69 0.93 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is the share of representatives from country i at time t at the ECB management level tabulated in the 
first line. Robust standard errors (clustering by country) in parentheses. **, *, and # denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Obs  248 248 248 248 236 
Adj. R
2  0.90 0.91 0.83 0.86 0.89 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is the (total) share of representatives from country i at time t in the management of the ECB. Robust 
standard errors (clustering by country) in parentheses. **, *, and # denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Year effects 
included but not reported. 
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Divisions Divisions Sections  Sections  Sections  Sections 
























































Other Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Obs  248 248 248 173 173 173 173 
Adj. R
2  0.84 0.90 0.92 0.86 0.86 0.90 0.92 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is the share of representatives from country i at time t at the ECB management level tabulated in the 
first line. Robust standard errors (clustering by country) in parentheses. **, *, and # denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Controls included but not reported: equal distribution share, ECB capital key subscription share, euro area member dummy, log distance from 
Frankfurt, common border with Germany dummy, German language dummy, English language dummy, log staff size national central bank.   27
Table 5: Does Presence in Top Management Matter? Robustness Checks 
 
 


























































Division      0.693
# 
(0.341) 
    1.195** 
(0.261) 
Other Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Obs  248 248 248 248 248 248 
Adj. R
2  0.87 0.93 0.88 0.79 0.85 0.62 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is the number of representatives from country i at time t at the ECB management level tabulated in the 
second line. Robust standard errors (clustering by country) in parentheses. **, *, and # denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Controls included but not reported: equal distribution share, ECB capital key subscription share, euro area member dummy, log distance from 
Frankfurt, common border with Germany dummy, German language dummy, English language dummy, log staff size national central bank. Year 
effects included but not reported. 
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Table 6: Taylor Rule Estimates in the Euro Area 
 
 
Sample 1999-2008  2004-2008 
Estimation 
method 
OLS OLS 2SLS OLS 


































AR parameter -0.111 
(0.056) 
   
      
Obs  112 113 112 53 
R
2  0.244 0.231 0.211 0.122 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the (change in the) main refinancing rate. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors in parentheses. 
** denotes significant at the 1% level.   29















































































          
Obs  113 113 53  113 113 113 113 113 
R
2  0.184 0.229 0.230 0.235 0.220 0.201 0.199 0.208 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is the (change in the) main refinancing rate. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard 
errors in parentheses. ** and * denote significant at the 1% and 5 % level, respectively.   30
Table 8: Does Representation Affect Monetary Policy? Robustness Checks 
 
 




Divisions Sections  Total  Directorates, 
Direct's 
General 
Divisions Sections  Total 


































































          
Obs  113 113 53  113 113 113 53  113 
R
2  0.184 0.229 0.230 0.232 0.159 0.250 0.257 0.248 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is the (change in the) main refinancing rate. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard 
errors in parentheses. ** and * denote significant at the 1% and 5 % level, respectively.   31
Appendix: Data Description and Sources 
 





Country share of ECB directors  Own computation  248  0.048  0.068  0  0.250 
Divisions  Country share of ECB division heads  Own computation  248  0.048  0.069  0  0.346 
Sections  Country share of ECB section heads  Own computation 173  0.048  0.075  0  0.408 
Total  Country share of ECB managers (total number 
of heads of directorate, division and section) 
Own computation  248  0.048  0.065  0  0.350 
Weighted  Country share of ECB managers (weighted 
number of heads of directorate [weight of 1], 
division [0.5] and section [0.25]) 
Own computation  248  0.048  0.064  0  0.315 
Executive Board  Country share of Executive Board members  Own computation  248  0.048  0.076  0  0.167 
Governing Council  Country share of Governing Council members  Own computation  248  0.048  0.044  0  0.118 
Equal Share  1/Number of EU member countries  Own computation  248  0.048  0.014  0.037  0.067 
Capital Share  ECB Capital Subscription Share  ECB  248  0.048  0.062  0.001  0.245 
Euro Area Member  Dummy = 1 if country is member of the euro 
area  
Own computation  248  0.621  0.486  0  1 
Distance  Distance of national capital from Frankfurt in 
km (Germany: 150 km) 
Own computation  248  970.5  580.7  150  2596 
Border  Dummy = 1 if country has common border with 
Germany 
Own computation  248  0.339  0.474  0  1 
German  Dummy = 1 if German is official language  Own computation  248  0.097  0.296  0  1 
English  Dummy = 1 if English is official language  Own computation  248  0.145  0.353  0  1 
Staff NCB  Log staff size of national central bank  Central Bank Directory  248  2792.7  4001.9  140  16077 
Main Refinancing 
Rate 
Main refinancing rate  ECB 114  3.066  0.896  2  4.75 
Inflation Gap  Deviation of professional forecast of CPI 
inflation from inflation target of 2% 
Consensus Economics  114  -0.104  0.279  -0.851  0.74 
Output Gap  Deviation of professional forecast of GDP 
growth from potential growth of 2.25% 
Consensus Economics  114  -0.15  0.534  -0.984  1.086 
 